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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby K. Fox*
and Tala Amirfazli***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2013 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to
federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression.' This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of statutory interpretation, subject matter jurisdiction, arbitration, and civil procedure.

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2000) (Phi Beta Kappa); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., with honors, 2003). Member, Emory International Law Review (2001-2002);
Notes and Comments Editor (2002-2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., cum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., with
honors, 2013). Member, Georgia State Law Review (2011-2013); Legislative Editor (20122013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of trial practice and procedure during the prior survey period, see
John O'Shea Sullivan, Ashby Kent Fox & Amanda E. Wilson, TrialPracticeand Procedure,
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 64 MERCER L. REv. 991 (2013).
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REMOvAL UNDER THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT:
WHETHER DEFENDANTS CAN REMOVE SEPARATE LAWSUITS
AS "MASS ACTIONS" UNDER CAFA IF THE LAWSUITS
IN THE AGGREGATE CONTAIN 100 OR MORE PLAINTIFFS
WHOSE CLAIMS INVOLVE COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT,
BUT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROPOSED THAT THE
CLAIMS BE TRIED JOINTLY

II.

In Scimone v. Carnival Corp.,2 the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter
of first impression, that a defendant cannot remove separate lawsuits
under the mass-action provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA), even if the lawsuits in the aggregate contain 100 or more
plaintiffs whose claims involve common questions of law or fact, if the
plaintiffs have not proposed that the claims be tried jointly.' The
lawsuits giving rise to this appeal arose out of the Carnival Costa
Concordia shipwreck. The plaintiffs were passengers, and the defendants included Carnival and its related corporate entities. The plaintiffs
filed two separate actions against Carnival in the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, with one action including fifty-six
plaintiffs and the other including forty-eight plaintiffs. The complaints
in both actions contained the same allegations and involved common
questions of law and fact.'
Carnival removed both actions to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida under CAFA's mass-action provision.6
The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because each action involved less than 100
plaintiffs (the number required for removal under CAFA's definition of
a "mass action"), and the plaintiffs had not proposed that the actions be

2. 720 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2013).
3. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tit. 28).
The mass-action provision of CAFA is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11). Scimone, 720
F.3d at 880.
4. Scimone, 720 F.3d at 878-79.
5. Id. The plaintiffs asserted claims against Carnival for "negligence, professional
negligence on the part of the ship's architect, and intentional torts." Id. at 879.
6. Id. at 879. Carnival also argued that the federal district court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases because they raised "substantial issues of federal common law
relating to foreign relations." Id. Carnival subsequently filed motions to dismiss in each
case based on the forum-selection clause of the plaintiffs' contracts and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Id.
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tried together.' The district court agreed that removal was improper
under CAFA's mass-action provision, and granted plaintiffs' motions to
remand.' The Eleventh Circuit permitted Carnival to appeal the
remand orders.'
Affirming the district court's findings, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed
that removal of the lawsuits was improper under CAFA's mass-action
provision.' 0 Citing CAFA's definition of "mass action" as a civil action
in which "claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried
jointly,"n the court held that because each case contained less than 100
plaintiffs, removal was improper unless the two cases were "proposed to
be tried jointly" prior to removal." Noting that CAFA's "passive syntax
makes it somewhat ambiguous who can make the proposal for joint
trial," the court held that "the statute must be referring to a proposal
made by the plaintiff, by the defendant, or perhaps by the state court
acting sua sponte."s Because CAFA expressly bars removal of actions
where the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant, and because
neither party in Scimone argued that the state court had ordered or
suggested a joint trial, the court identified the essential question as
whether the plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of their claims in state
Court. 14
The court held its interpretation of CAFA to be consistent with four
longstanding removal principles: (1) jurisdictional facts must be assessed

7. Id. at 879-80. CAFA defines the term "mass action" as "any civil action... in which
monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11XB)(i) (2012). The plaintiffs also argued that the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction because the cases did not raise substantial issues implicating foreign
relations. Scimone, 720 F.3d at 880.
8. Scimone, 720 F.3d at 880. The district court held that the "problem for removal
jurisdiction under [] CAFA is that neither suit has 100 plaintiffs alone. It is also a problem
that the Plaintiffs have not proposed for the cases to be tried jointly. Therefore, [] CAFA
does not supply a basis for removing these two identical lawsuits." Id. The district court
also rejected Carnival's argument that the cases raised substantial issues of "federal
common law regarding foreign policy." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(dX11XBXi)).
12. Id. at 881 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(BXi)).
13. Id.
14. Id. "We leave open the possibility that the state trial judge's sua sponte
consolidation of 100 or more persons' claims could satisfy the jurisdictional requirements
of § 1332(d)(11)(B)(I). Since neither party has suggested that the state court ordered or
even raised the possibility of a joint trial, we have no occasion to, and do not decide that
question." Scimone, 720 F.3d at 881.
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at the time of removal;" (2) plaintiffs are free to structure their
complaints so as to avoid federal jurisdiction;16 (3) the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the removing defendant;"
and (4) the right to remove must be strictly construed, with all
uncertainties being resolved in favor of remand.'"
Based on this analysis, the court held that removal was improper
because Carnival, as the removing defendant, could not demonstrate
that the plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of their claims." The
plaintiffs chose to file two separate complaints in state court with each
naming less than 100 plaintiffs, and they never sought to consolidate the
lawsuits or proposed a joint trial of their claims.20 Thus, the court held
that "nothing in how the plaintiffs structured their complaints amounted
to a 'proposal"' under CAFA's mass action provision, "[nior did plaintiffs'
subsequent litigation conduct amount to a proposal to try 100 or more
persons' claims jointly."2 ' In support of its findings, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that "[elvery other court of appeals confronted with this
question has come to the same conclusion: that plaintiffs have the ability
to avoid § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) jurisdiction by filing separate complaints
naming less than 100 plaintiffs and by not moving for or otherwise
proposing joint trial in the state court."2 2 In sum, the holding in

15. Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882. "This principle, when read along with the statutory
language, necessarily means that the defendant cannot propose joint trial because the
proposal must be made in the state court prior to the defendant's attempt to remove the
case, and-pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II)-the defendant cannot move for
consolidation in state court and subsequently take advantage of federal removal
jurisdiction." Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882 (emphasis omitted).
16. Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882. The court stated, "We permit this so long as the method
of avoidance is not fraudulent." Id.
17. Id. (quoting Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) ("CAFA
did not alter the 'longstanding, near-canonical rule' that the burden of proving jurisdictional requirements rests with the removing defendant.")).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 883.
21. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)).
22. Id. at 884. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Carnival's argument that the plaintiffs
were using artful pleading to defeat Carnival's right to a federal forum, and that the court
was ignoring the purpose of CAFA, which was to expand federal jurisdiction and facilitate
removal of mass actions. Id. at 885. In response, the court held as follows:
The problem with the first objection is that Carnival presupposes that which it
first has to prove: that it is entitled to a federal forum for two complaints that, on
their face, each involve less than 100 claims. Carnival is only entitled to a federal
forum if the plaintiffs filed a single complaint in state court that involved 100 or
more persons' claims or otherwise proposed a joint trial for multiple complaints
that in the aggregate contain 100 or more plaintiffs. The problem with the second

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

20141

1109

Scimone provides plaintiffs with a mechanism for avoiding removal
under CAFA's mass-action provision by filing separate actions with less
than 100 plaintiffs and not seeking a joint trial of their claims.
III.

ARBITRATION: WHETHER AN ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED
His POWERS UNDER THE FAA BY CONSTRUING
AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE TO ALLOW FOR
CLASS ARBITRATION AND CERTIFYING A CLASS
WHERE THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE CONTAINS
No REFERENCE TO CLASS ARBITRATION

In Southern Communications Services v. Thomas,' the Eleventh
Circuit addressed whether, under the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter' and Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds InternationalCorp.,25 an arbitrator exceeded his powers
under § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 26 in construing an
arbitration clause to allow for class arbitration and in certifying a class
when the arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class arbitration. 27 The dispute in Thomas arose between a wireless provider
(SouthernLINC) and its customer (Thomas) over early termination fees
that Thomas was charged when he cancelled his cell-phone service.2 s
Thomas's contract with SouthernLINC contained an arbitration clause
that "contained no reference to class arbitration."2 Thomas, for himself

objection is that there is no indication that Congress's purpose in enacting CAFA
was to strip plaintiffs of their ordinary role as masters of their complaint and
allow defendants to treat separately filed actions as one action regardless of
plaintiffs' choice.
Id.
23. 720 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2013).
24. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
25. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012).
27. Thomas, 720 F.3d at 1354, 1356.
28. Id. at 1354-55.
29. Id. at 1355. The arbitration clause, which was included in SouthernLINC's
standard contract, stated:
The parties will make good faith attempts to resolve any disputes. If the parties
cannot resolve the dispute within 60 days after the matter is submitted to them,
then, unless otherwise agreed, the parties will submit the dispute to arbitration.
The parties will request that arbitrator(s) hold a hearing within 60 days following
their designation, and render a final and binding resolution within 30 days after
the hearing. The parties will conduct the arbitration in Atlanta, Georgia pursuant
to applicable Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association.
Id.
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"and a nationwide class of consumers," filed a demand for arbitration
with the American Arbitration Association (AAA), arguing that
SouthernLINC's early termination fees were unlawful penalties under
state and federal law.ao Thomas also moved for a Clause Construction
Award to allow class action treatment pursuant to the AAA's rules. 3'
The arbitrator issued a Partial Final Clause Construction Award,
finding that the arbitration clause in SouthernLINC's contract permitted
class arbitration because: (1) "the arbitration clause did not expressly
bar class treatment," and class treatment was permitted under Georgia
law; (2) Georgia law permits class treatment "when individual class
member[s'] claims are meager;" and (3) class treatment "presents an
efficient mechanism for dispute resolution."12 The arbitrator then
granted Thomas's motion for class certification.33
SouthernLINC petitioned the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia to vacate the arbitration awards pursuant
to FAA § 10(a)(4), which permits vacatur "where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made."3 The district court denied SouthernLINC's motion, finding that

30. Id. at 1355-56. Thomas claimed that the early termination fees were unlawful
penalties pursuant to Georgia law, and were "unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful"
pursuant to the Federal Communications Act. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-6-7 (2010) and 47
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2006)). Thomas sought "a declaration that the fees he paid were unlawful;
an injunction on behalf of the class ... to prevent SouthernLINC from engaging in
deceptive, unjust, and unreasonable practices; statutory, consequential, and incidental
damages; disgorgement of all termination fees; additional appropriate declaratory relief;
and interest." Id. at 1356.
31. Id. at 1356. Thomas sought the Clause Construction Award pursuant to Rule 3 of
the AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations.
32. Id. (alteration in original).
33. Id. SouthernLINC moved for reconsideration of the Clause Construction Award
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen. Id. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme
Court held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA where,
when interpreting a contract that was silent as to class arbitration and a stipulation
between the parties that they had reached no agreement on that issue, the arbitrator came
to a decision without "identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the FAA"
or applicable law. Thomas, 720 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676).
Upon reconsideration, the arbitrator held that although the first and third grounds for
finding class treatment permissible under the arbitration clause were improper under
Stolt-Nielsen, his second ground "satisfied the rigorous requirements set forth in StoltNielsen" because, by relying on Eleventh Circuit interpretation of Georgia law in reaching
his conclusion that Georgia law favored class treatment when the amount in controversy
was very small and class certification was needed to "vindicate [the members'] rights," he
based his award "on a rule of law or rule of decision as Stolt-Nielsen requires." Id. at 1356.
34. Thomas, 720 F.3d at 1357-58 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).
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"an arbitrator's 'incorrect legal conclusion is not grounds for vacating or
modifying [an] award,'"M and that it did not have jurisdiction to vacate
an award "even in the event of an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the
law."16 SouthernLINC appealed."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding
in Sutter, which addressed whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers
under the FAA in determining that parties affirmatively agreed to
authorize class arbitration "based solely on their use of broad contractual
language precluding litigation and requiring arbitration of any dispute
arising under their contract."38 In that case, a doctor (Sutter) sued an
insurance company (Oxford) on behalf of himself and a proposed class of
doctors under contract with Oxford. Oxford moved to compel arbitration,
and the parties agreed that whether the contract authorized class
arbitration should be the decision of the arbitrator.3" Although the
arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class arbitration, the
arbitrator decided that the provision "expresse [d] the parties' intent that
class arbitration can be maintained."4 0 Oxford moved to vacate the
arbitrator's findings both before and after the Supreme Court's decision
in Stolt-Nielsen, wherein the Court held that an arbitrator exceeded his
authority under § 10(a)(4) where, when considering a contract silent as
to class arbitration and the parties' stipulation that they had not
reached an agreement on that issue, the arbitrator reached a decision
without "identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the
FAA" or applicable law." The Supreme Court in Sutter distinguished
Stolt-Nielsen on the grounds that, in Sutter, the parties had "bargained
for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement" and that "an arbitral
decision 'even arguably construing or applying the contract' must stand,

35. Id. at 1357 (alteration in original) (quoting White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v.
Glawson Invs. Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011)).
36. Id. The district court further held that the arbitrator "engaged in the exact
analysis" required by Stolt-Nielson because he "identified generally applicable contract law
principles to determine whether the parties implicitly authorized class arbitration ....
[He identified legal principles governing the situation: state law governing contract
formation and interpretation." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. Commc'n Servs., Inc.
v. Thomas, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2011)).
37. Id. at 1354.
38. Id. at 1357. Because Sutter was before the Supreme Court while the case of
Thomas was pending before the Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the case
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Sutter. Id.
39. Id. at 1358 (citing Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2067).
40. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2067).
41. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676).
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regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits." 2 Thus, the Court in
Sutter held that "'the sole question' a court should ask under the
exacting standards of § 10(a)(4) 'is whether the arbitrator (even
arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not whether he got its
meaning right or wrong."'"
In Thomas, SouthernLINC argued that because there was no "textual
indication of agreement to class arbitration" in the contract or otherwise
between the parties, the arbitrator lacked any basis for finding an
agreement to allow class arbitration, and the standards in Stolt-Nielsen
rather than Sutter applied." Rejecting this argument, the Eleventh
Circuit held that "SouthernLINC gave the question of whether the
contract allowed for class arbitration to the arbitrator through its choice
of rules and by failing to'dispute th[e] [airbitrator's jurisdiction to decide
this threshold issue."" Thus, the court relied on Sutter in finding that
"under § 10(a)(4), if 'the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the

42. Id. (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2068) (internal citation omitted). The court in
Sutter distinguished Stolt-Nielsen, noting that the absence of any reference to class
arbitration in the arbitration provision coupled with the parties' stipulation that they had
never reached an agreement on class arbitration "meant necessarily that 'the arbitral
decision [in Stolt-Nielsen] . . . lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures'"
such that "in setting aside the arbitrators' decision, we found not that they had
misinterpreted the contract, but that they had abandoned their interpretive role." Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2070).
43. Id. at 1359 (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2068). The Supreme Court did note in
Sutter that the result may have been different
if Oxford had argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called
"question of arbitrability." Those questions-which "include certain gateway
matters, such as whether parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or
whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of
controversy" -are presumptively for courts to decide .... [T]his Court has not yet
decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability
... [bNut this case gives us no opportunity to do so because Oxford agreed that the.
arbitrator should determine whether its contract with Sutter authorized class
procedures.
Id. at 1358 n.6 (alteration in original). Like the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit noted
in Thomas that
we also have not decided whether the availability of class arbitration is a question
of arbitrability. However, as in Sutter, this case does not give us the opportunity
to consider the question, because here SouthernLINC gave the question ofwhether
the contract allowed for class arbitration to the arbitrator through its choice of
rules and by failing to "dispute th[e] [alrbitrator's jurisdiction to decide this
threshold issue."
Id. (alterations in original).
44. Id. at 1359.
45. Id. at 1358 n.6 (alterations in original).
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parties' contract,' a court must end its inquiry and deny a § 10(a) motion
The court further held that
for vacatur.'
[i]t is only in the rare instance where a court finds that a contract
"lackts] any contractual basis for ordering class procedures". . . that it
must proceed to the analysis directed by Stolt-Nielsen and ask whether
the arbitrator "identiflied] and appl[ied] a rule of decision derived from
the FAA" or other applicable body of law or, alternatively, merely
"imposed its own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers."47
In applying the holding in Sutter to the facts of Thomas, the Eleventh
Circuit held that because the arbitrator relied on the language of the
parties' contract and arguably interpreted that contract in issuing his
awards, he did not "stray [] from his delegated task of interpreting a
contract."'8 Accordingly, the court held that "[ilt is not for us to opine
on whether or not that task was done badly, for lilt is the arbitrator's
construction [of the contract] which was bargained for. . . .' The
arbitrator's construction holds, however good, bad, or ugly."
In so
holding, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
SouthernLINC's motion to vacate, finding that "[uinder the highly
deferential standard of §10 (aX4), the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority in his issuance either of the clause construction award or of
the class determination award."o The holding in Thomas implies that
if there is any evidence that the parties agreed that the arbitrator
should determine whether their contract allows for class arbitration,
then the arbitrator's decision on that issue will stand.

46. Id. at 1359.
47. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2069; Stolt-Nielsen, 559
U.S. at 676-77).
48. Id. at 1360 (alteration in original) (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2070).
49. Id. (first two alterations in original) (quoting Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2070-71).
50. Id. SouthernLINC argued that the class certification award should be vacated
because the arbitrator erroneously applied the class certification standards in certifying the
class. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting again that this Circuit does not
recognize an "incorrect legal conclusion" or a "manifest disregard of the law" as grounds
for vacating an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4). Thomas, 720 F.3d at 1360 (internal
citations omitted) (quoting White Springs, 660 F.3d at 1280; Frazier v. Citifinancial Corp.,
LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010)). The court noted earlier in the opinion that,
based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates,LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 581 (2008), §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA provided the exclusive grounds for vacatur
and modification of arbitration awards, such that "judicially[]created bases for vacatur"
that the Eleventh Circuit formerly had recognized were no longer valid. Thomas, 720 F.3d
at 1358.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Whether the District Court Can Convert the Unpaid Remainder of
an Equitable Disgorgement Order,Stemming from a Compensatory
Civil Contempt Sanction, into a Money Judgment
In FTC v. Leshin," the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first
impression, that a district court could convert the unpaid remainder of
an equitable disgorgement order, emerging from a compensatory civil
contempt sanction, into the legal remedy of a money judgment after the
contemnor had disgorged as much money as he could currently pay.52
The dispute in Leshin arose out of a prior lawsuit between the parties,
which was settled through a stipulated injunction." Leshin violated
the injunction, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held him in civil contempt and entered a disgorgement order against him as a compensatory sanction.5 4 The disgorgement order stated that "[aifter disgorgement and any attendant
contempt enforcement are complete, the FTC may apply to the Court to
convert any unpaid balance of this civil contempt remedy to a money
judgment.""
Leshin did not comply with the disgorgement order, and the district
court held him to be in contempt of that order. The court ordered Leshin
to pay $92,671 of the $594,987.90 original disgorgement amount or face
jail time. Leshin purged the second contempt by paying the $92,671, but
the original disgorgement order (less the $92,671) remained in effect.
The FTC moved to have the unpaid remainder of the disgorgement order

51. 719 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2013) (Leshin II).
52. Id. at 1229. The court noted that "this case is unusual, as the lack of precedent on
the subject indicates." Id.
53. Id. In FTC v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1227-31 (11th Cir. 2010) (Leshin I), the court
detailed the facts underlying the dispute. Leshin II, 719 F.3d at 1229. In Leshin I, the
FTC filed suit against Randall Leshin and his co-appellants for deceptive marketing
practices and other violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act committed by Leshin's
debt-consolidation business. Id. The parties settled the earlier action, and the district
court entered a stipulated injunction embodying the parties' settlement. Id
54. Leshin II, 719 F.2d at 1229. Specifically, the district court ordered Leshin to
disgorge the gross receipts of his business during the relevant time frame, in the total
amount of $594,987.90. Id. Leshin appealed this order in Leshin I and a panel of the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's power to require disgorgement of a business's
gross receipts in a civil contempt proceeding. Id. The Court further held that the
disgorgement of gross receipts did not render the sanction punitive and thereby transform
the proceedings from civil to criminal contempt. Id. at 1229-30.
55. Id. at 1229.

20141

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1115

converted into a money judgment, and the district court granted the
motion.16
Leshin appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
by converting the unpaid remainder of the disgorgement order, an
equitable remedy, into a money judgment, a legal remedy." Disagreeing with Leshin and affirming the district court's findings, the Eleventh
Circuit first noted that district courts have "extremely broad and flexible
powers" in the area of civil contempt." Next, the court noted that
because the district court could have granted a money judgment as the
remedy for Leshin's civil contempt in the first place," there was no
reason why the district court could not convert the disgorgement order
into a money judgment to satisfy "the requirements of full remedial
relief."o The court rejected Leshin's argument that the conversion
violated the doctrine of election of remedies because the remedies were
not inconsistent and did not allow for double recovery given that the
money judgment only covered the unpaid remainder of the disgorgement
order.6' Thus the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not

56. Id. at 1229-30. The district court held that $92,671 was the total amount that
Leshin was able to pay at that time. The purpose of this second contempt order was
coercive, not compensatory. Id.
57. Id. at 1230, 1231.
58. Id. at 1231.
59. Id. Leshin never disputed this fact, and conceded the same in his briefs by stating
that "[tihe FTC could have sought a contempt sanction of a compensatory money judgment,
but instead specifically asked for disgorgement," and "[the FTC says that the district court
could have entered a money judgment all along." Id. Further, the Eleventh Circuit held
that "[a] lthough we have found no case squarely on point, the Supreme Court and at least
one court of appeals have acknowledged that a court can issue a money judgment as a
remedy for civil contempt." Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325
U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (containing dicta regarding "process [that] conceivably may be issued
for satisfaction of a money judgment for contempt"); In re Profl Air Traffic Controllers Org.,
699 F.2d 539, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing how one party "registered its three civil
contempt money judgments")).
60. Id. at 1232 (quoting McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949)).
The court noted that while "this bifurcation of remedies [is] unusual, courts in other
contexts regularly grant both equitable and legal relief" and "we are at a loss to see why
the district court lacked the power to grant both the equitable remedy and the legal one
so long as it did not permit double recovery." Id. (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 1233.
In this case, the district court's conversion of the remainder of the disgorgement
order into a money judgment does not run afoul of the election of remedies
doctrine. Plainly, the two remedies are not inconsistent-they rely on precisely
the same set of facts-and do not allow double recovery; the roughly $90,000 that
the FTC obtained under the disgorgement order has been deducted from the
original contempt award, and the money judgment covers only the remainder.
Id.
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abuse its "considerable discretion" by "merely [doing] what it could have
done from the beginning of the contempt proceeding"-granting a
compensatory contempt remedy in the form of a money judgment.6 2
B. Are a Testifying Expert's Notes and Communications with NonLawyers DiscoverableAfter the 2010 Amendments to FederalRule of
Civil Procedure 26?
In Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee,63 the Eleventh Circuit held that
a testifying expert is required to produce personal notes and communications with other experts, although draft expert reports and communications with the party's counsel are properly shielded under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26" from discovery." The underlying litigation
giving rise to the appeal in Hinchee started in 1993 when a group of
Ecuadorian plaintiffs fied a class action lawsuit against a predecessor
of Chevron, alleging that oil exploration in the Amazonian rain forest
caused pollution that was responsible for the plaintiffs' oil-related health
problems and environmental contamination. After the 1993 litigation in
New York was dismissed for forum non conveniens, the plaintiffs filed
similar claims in Ecuador in 2003. The Ecuadorian court entered
judgment in 2011 awarding the plaintiffs $18.2 billion in damages
against Chevron.66
Chevron objected to the litigation in Ecuador and sought arbitration
against the Republic of Ecuador (the Republic) in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands. Chevron argued that the
Republic violated the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty
(the Treaty) by failing to recognize a settlement agreement between
Chevron and the Republic, failing to indemnify Chevron in connection
with the civil litigation, and other issues relating to the civil case.

62. Id. at 1235. Leshin argued that he purged the entirety of his original civil contempt
order when he paid the $92,671 pursuant to the second contempt order. Id. at 1233. The
court disagreed, finding that the payment only purged the second, coercive contempt order
which was entered after the original disgorgement order. Id. Leshin also argued that he
purged the original order when he paid the $92,671 because that was all he had the ability
to pay. Id. The court also rejected this argument, noting that while the inability to pay
was a "complete defense" to a coercive contempt sanction, inability to pay was no defense
to a compensatory contempt sanction. Id.
63. 741 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2013).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (2012).
65. Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1189.
66. Id. at 1186-87; see also Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1998). An
appellate court reduced this judgment to $9.1 billion. Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1187.
67. Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1187.
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In connection with the Treaty arbitration, Chevron sought materials
and documents in the possession of experts who testified for the
plaintiffs in the Ecuadorian litigation, including experts residing in the
United States. Similarly, the Republic sought discovery from Chevron's
expert witnesses, including from Dr. Robert Hinchee, a Florida
resident." The Republic requested that the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida issue a subpoena to Dr.
Hinchee for a deposition and production of documents pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1782, which allows the district court to issue orders to give
"[alssistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants
before such tribunals.""0 Hinchee was an "environmental engineer and
an expert in the assessment and remediation of petroleum contaminated
sites," and Chevron relied on his expert reports in the Ecuadorian
litigation and the Treaty arbitration."
After the district court granted the Republic's request for the
subpoena, Hinchee and Chevron produced approximately 94,000 pages
of documents, but asserted work-product protection over 1200 documents. The Republic moved to compel production of the remaining 1200
documents and requested an in camera review, and the district court
ordered Chevron to submit 40 of the withheld documents for the in
camera review. After the in camera review, the district court ruled that
39 of the 40 documents were not privileged-the only protected
document was a draft of an expert report. 72 The remaining 39 documents consisted of Hinchee's notes and his communications with "one or
more individuals who were neither attorneys nor members of an
attorney's staff.""
Some of those communications were between
Hinchee and other expert witnesses testifying for Chevron, while others
were communications between Hinchee and Chevron employees who
were not attorneys.
The district court held that the 39 documents
ordered to be produced were not protected by the work-product doctrine,
which the court held "[does] not protect a testifying expert's own notes
or communications with another testifying expert."
On appeal, Chevron argued that Hinchee's notes and communications
that the district court ordered to be produced were protected, either

68.
69.
70.
oppose
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1187. Chevron intervened in the district court action to also
the subpoena of Hinchee. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bX3)(A), or alternatively,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(aX2XB), as amended in 2010.76 The
Eleventh Circuit analyzed both arguments using the Advisory Committee's notes to the Rules, the history of the Rules, and rules of statutory
construction to find that Hinchee's notes and communications with nonattorneys were not entitled to work-product protection and had to be
produced."
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) and (b)(4). The
Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in Hinchee with a review of Rule
26(b)(1), which describes the general scope of discovery, and held that
because Hinchee's notes and communications with non-attorneys were
relevant, the Republic was entitled to discover them unless Chevron and
Hinchee could establish that a privilege or work-product protection
exempted them from discovery." The court quickly ruled out privilege
because the communications did not involve Chevron's attorneys, so the
only issue for analysis was protection under the work-product doctrine." Analyzing Rule 26(bX3)(A), the court discussed the Rule's
enactment in 1970 as a codification of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor," a seminal case." Chevron
and Hinchee's argument was that Rule 26(b)(3)(A) protects Hinchee's
materials because Hinchee was Chevron's "representative," making the
materials "prepared by or for a representative" as stated in the Rule.82
Alternatively, Chevron and Hinchee argued that the materials were
covered by Rule 26(bX3)(A) because they were "prepared for a party.""
The Eleventh Circuit considered the threshold question on this issue
to be whether Rule 26(b)(3XA) applies to a testifying expert and held
that it did not." The court held that the Rule's failure to include the
word "expert" in the list of persons who create work-product materials
indicates that the work-product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3XA) does not
include experts.' This conclusion is confirmed by the enactment of
Rule 26(bX4)(A) in 1970, which addresses the discovery of facts known

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1189.
Id.
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1189.
Id. at 1190 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3XA)).
Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3XA)).
Id.
Id.
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and opinions held by testifying experts.' Because the 1970 version of
Rule 26(bX4)(A) permitted interrogatories requesting a testifying expert's
facts and opinions, and because the 1970 Advisory Committee Notes
explained that the new Rule 26(b)(4) was intended to reject the case law
that sought to bring expert information within the work-product
doctrine, the Rules indicate the intent that testifying experts' work
product not come under the work-product doctrine. The court also
discussed the 2010 amendment to Rule 26(bX4), which was "added to
provide work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(3XA) and (B) for drafts
of expert reports or disclosures."' Because the 2010 amendment to
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) was added to provide work product protection for
attorney-expert communications, the amendment was not intended to
"impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the
development, foundation, or basis of those opinions."
The court then turned to rules of statutory construction and noted that
because the drafters explicitly addressed work-product claims with
respect to experts in Rule 26(b)(4) but never mentioned experts in
26(b)(3), Chevron's argument that Rule 26(b)(3)(A) would apply to all
testifying expert materials in general was incorrect." Reading these
rules together, Chevron's argument would render parts of Rule 26(b)(4)
superfluous as they apply specifically to testifying experts. 91 The court
concluded that the drafters' omission of all testifying expert materials,
such as notes and communications with non-attorneys, from workproduct protection reflects a "calculated decision" to not extend workproduct protection to a testifying expert's notes and communications
with non-attorneys.92
The court also emphasized the purpose of the work-product doctrine,
which is to protect a lawyer's work and mental impressions and the need
for attorneys to maintain some privacy in their work, a purpose that is
not infringed by the production of an expert's notes and communications
with non-lawyers." The court also held significant the 2013 opinion
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in a
similar proceeding between the Republic and Chevron with respect to a
subpoena to another of Chevron's experts in Colorado where the Tenth

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note).
89. Id. at 1191 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1191-92.
93. Id. at 1192; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (holding that a
federal trial court may compel production of an investigator's report).
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Circuit held that the work-product protection of Rule 26(b)(3) did not
extend to materials prepared by or for Chevron's testifying expert.94
2. Protection for Testifying Experts' Materials Under Rule
26(a)(2)(B) and the 2010 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Chevron and Hinchee also argued that the 2010
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure narrowed the expert
disclosure requirements of 26(aX2)(B) and thus shielded Hinchee's notes
and communications with non-attorneys from disclosure.9 5 As with
Rule 26(b)(3) and (b)(4), the court analyzed the history of Rule 26(a),
beginning with the 1993 amendments, which added the mandatory
requirements for testifying expert reports that required "a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support
for the opinions."
The opinions following the 1993 amendments
concluded that Rule 26 "created a bright-line rule requiring disclosure
of all information provided to testifying experts, including attorney
opinion work-product."97 The broad interpretation of the language
"other information" in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) undermined the protection of
attorney opinion work product provided by Rule 26(b)(3).98
To alter this line of cases arising out of the 1993 amendments, the
drafters changed the Rule again in 2010, accomplishing two things: first,
Rules 26(b)(4XB) and (C) were enacted to protect draft expert reports
and attorney-expert communications as work product, and second, Rule
26(a)(2)(B) changed the language "data or other information" to "facts or
data."9" With reference to the 2010 Advisory Committee Notes, the
court held that the amendments preserved the desire to protect the
opinion work product of attorneys in the context of expert discovery,
while continuing to allow discovery of the "facts or data" considered by
the expert without impeding upon the core opinion work product of
attorneys.' 00
The court held that because Hinchee's personal notes and communications with other experts did not constitute draft reports or commuica-

94. Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1192-93 (citing Carrion v. For the Issuance of a Subpoena
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (In re Republic of Ecuador), 735 F.3d 1179, 1183-85 (10th Cir.
2013)).
95. Id. at 1193.
96. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1194.
99. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(aX2XB)).
100. Id. at 1194-95.
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tions with attorneys, and because they did not contain the "core opinion
work-product of Chevron's attorneys," the 2010 amendments did not
create an exception under the work-product doctrine for Hinchee's notes
and communications with non-attorneys.'o
While the opinion in Hinchee appears to be well-reasoned and logical
under the facts of that case, questions remain as to the practical
application of the holding. Just as attorneys altered their practices and
procedures following the 1993 Rules to emphasize oral, not written,
communications with experts and a limited number of draft reports to
minimize material available for discovery, the Hinchee opinion is likely
to promote testifying experts' use of draft reports for note-taking, as well
as restrict the expert's communications to the party's attorneys to ensure
that otherwise discoverable communications remain non-discoverable.
C. Can a Party's Self-serving Testimony Create a Fact Issue Requiring
the Denial of Summary Judgment?
In Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach,'02 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the plaintiffs "self-serving" sworn statements that contradicted the
defendant's versions of the facts were sufficient to require the denial of
summary judgment to the defendants because they created a genuine
issue of material fact, notwithstanding that the plaintiff's statements
might have been conclusory and asserted only in her self interest.'03
The plaintiff in Feliciano sued four Miami police officers for various
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," alleging that the officers violated her
Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted a warrantless entry and
search of her home. The sole claim on appeal was the alleged Fourth
Amendment violation for the entry and search of the plaintiff's home
without a warrant and the officers' motion for summary judgment on
their defense of qualified immunity.'o
The qualified-immunity defense was based mostly on the arrest report
and deposition testimony of one officer in which he stated that he
smelled marijuana emanating from the plaintiff's apartment when the
officers arrived. He testified that he saw a man smoking a joint as he
walked out of the bedroom, and then saw the man attempt to conceal the

101. Id. at 1195. The court noted that to the extent any attorney core opinion work
product was embedded in the 1200 documents at issue, Chevron and Hinchee were entitled
to redact such portions and describe them in a privilege log in accordance with Rule
26(b)(5) to be submitted for in camera review if requested by the Republic. Id.
102. 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013).
103. Id. at 1253.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
105. Feliciano,707 F.3d at 1247.
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joint by lowering his hand and hiding it in his palm. The plaintiff
"adamantly disputed" the officers' account, testifying that the man had
nothing in his hands when he emerged from the bedroom, that neither
the plaintiff nor the man was smoking marijuana, and that there was no
smell of marijuana in the apartment when the officers arrived. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
the officers' motion for summary judgment, but not based on the two
different factual versions presented by the plaintiff and the officers.
Instead, the district court held that the scope of the officers' search while
inside the apartment violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights.o Thus, the district court accepted the officers' assertions that
they smelled and saw marijuana to conclude that they had "arguable
probable cause and arguable exigent circumstances" that justified their
immediate entry into the apartment without consent. 10
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, reviewing the summary judgment
order de novo, focused on the differences in the versions of the facts as
presented by the plaintiff and the officers.'o The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the officers, but for a
different reason than the one articulated by the district court. 09
The Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court improperly discounted [the plaintiffs] sworn statements about what the officers could have observed before they entered
the apartment, failed to construe the facts in the light most favorable
to [the plaintiff], and impermissibly credited the officers' assertions
that they noticed the smell of marijuana coming from the apartment
and saw [the man] smoking or holding a joint."o
The Eleventh Circuit held that even if a district court "believes that the
evidence presented by one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to
grant summary judgment on the basis of credibility choices.""n The
court explained that "credibility determinations and the weighing of
evidence 'are jury functions, not those of a judge.'""' The Eleventh
Circuit criticized the district court for accepting "as uncontroverted" and

106. Id. at 1249-50. The district court acknowledged the plaintiffs testimony that
contradicted the officers' version, but found that her "bare assertions" did not suffice to
create a genuine issue of material fact about the officers' observations because her
testimony was "conclusory" and was not supported by any objective evidence. Id.
107. Id. at 1250.
108. Id. at 1247.
109. Id. at 1251-52.
110. Id. at 1252.
111. Id. (quoting Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006)).
112. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
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"effectively undisputed" the officers' assertions that before entering the
apartment, they smelled marijuana and saw a joint in the man's hand,
but dismissing the plaintiff's directly contradictory testimony as "bare,"
"conclusory," and "unsupported" by objective evidence.' The Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff's testimony did not consist of "conclusory
and unsubstantiated allegations of fabrication of evidence," which are
proper for the district court to disregard, and instead constituted "nonconclusory descriptions of specific, discrete facts of the who, what, when,
and where variety.""
The court held that because the plaintiff's
testimony was not conclusory, and because it directly contradicted the
officers' assertions about what they observed before and after they
entered the apartment, the conflicting testimony presented "a classic
swearing match" requiring a jury trial."'
The court went to some lengths to try to distinguish between
testimony that is entitled to be disregarded by the district court on
summary judgment and testimony that is required to be considered on
summary judgment, although the opinion fails to provide much guidance
for recognizing testimony that should be disregarded and testimony that
should be considered."'
The legal issue to which the testimony
pertained in Feliciano applied to the standard for "arguable probable
cause," which the court said existed when "reasonable officers in the
same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
[dlefendants could have believed that probable cause existed.""'
Because the standard for arguable probable cause focuses on the officers'
observations, knowledge, and belief in the circumstances, it is unclear as
to how the plaintiffs admittedly self-serving testimony could create a
factual issue as to the officers' observations, knowledge, and beliefs at
the scene."' Nevertheless, the court appropriately pointed out that
although the plaintiff's sworn statements were self-serving, they were
"no more conclusory, self-serving, or unsubstantiated by objective
evidence than the officers' assertions that they smelled marijuana
coming from her apartment and saw [the man] smoking or holding a
joint."u9

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1252-53 (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
115. Id. at 1253.
116. Id. at 1253-54.
117. Id. at 1251 (quoting Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 996 (11th Cir. 1995)).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1253.
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V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Whether an Award of LiquidatedDamages is Mandatory or
DiscretionaryUnder the RetaliationProvision of the FLSA
In Moore v. Appliance Direct, Inc.,120 the Eleventh Circuit, as a
matter of first impression, joined the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in ruling that the retaliation provision of
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 121 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 122 gives
district courts discretion to award liquidated damages in retaliation
cases when doing so is appropriate under the facts of the case."' The
dispute in Moore began when the plaintiff employees (delivery-truck
drivers) sued their employer and its CEO for alleged violations of the
FLSA's overtime provisions. While the overtime lawsuit was pending,
the defendants began changing the employment status of their deliverytruck drivers from employees to independent contractors. The plaintiffs
in the overtime lawsuit did not receive offers to become independent
contractors, and they lost their jobs as a result. The plaintiffs then filed
a separate action in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, alleging that the defendants retaliated against them
for filing the overtime lawsuit in violation of a provision of the FLSA.
At trial, a jury held in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages. The
plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion asking that liquidated damages be
added to the jury's damage awards. The district court denied the
motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. 124
At issue on appeal was "whether the district court was required to
award the [p]laintiffs liquidated damages in addition to the economic
damages awarded by the jury."125 The plaintiffs argued that 29 U.S.C.

120. 708 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2013).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
123. Moore, 708 F.3d at 1242-43.
124. Id. at 1235-36. Pak, the CEO of the defendant employer Appliance Direct and the
only defendant left in the retaliation case after Appliance Direct filed bankruptcy, also
cross-appealed on various issues that are unrelated to the retaliation provision of the FLSA
and thus are not discussed herein. Id.
125. Id. at 1238. The Eleventh Circuit noted that
[tihis presents our court with a question of first impression: Does the FLSA
mandate the imposition of liquidated damages after a finding of liability for
retaliation, unless excused by proof of reasonable good faith of the employer, the
same as it does after a finding of liability for unpaid minimum wages and
overtime, or are liquidated damages discretionary in a retaliation case?
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§ 216(b) mandates an award of liquidated damages in retaliation cases,
just as in minimum wage and overtime cases under the FLSA, absent
proof of the reasonable good faith of the employer. 1 26 The court discussed 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which governs the award of liquidated
damages in FLSA cases and provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section
207 of this title [minimum wage or overtime provisions] shall be liable
to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this
title [retaliation provision] shall be liable for such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section
215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment,
reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages.n
The plaintiffs relied on decisions from the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that held, without analyzing
the statutory language, that liquidated damages were mandatory in
FLSA retaliation cases. 128 The defendant relied on cases from the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits that held that the "as may be appropriate"
language in § 216(b) gave the district court discretion in awarding
liquidated damages in retaliation cases. 129 The Eleventh Circuit

Id.
126. Id. at 1239. The reasonable good faith exception found in 29 U.S.C. § 260 provides
that:
In any action . .. to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended. . . if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or
omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable
grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA],
the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any
amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
Moore, 708 F.3d at 1239 (alteration in original).
127. Moore, 708 F.3d at 1238 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
128. Id. at 1239 (citing Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1223 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that an award of liquidated damages was mandatory under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) without analyzing statutory language or purpose); Lowe v. Southmark Corp., 998
F.2d 335, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an award of liquidated damages was
mandatory under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) without an analysis of the statutory language or
purpose)).
129. Id. (citing Braswell v. City of El Dorado, 187 F.3d 954,958 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the statutory language in the retaliation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) modified the
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"jointed] the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in holding that the second
sentence in section 216(b), which allows such damages 'as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the retaliation provision],'
creates a separate, discretionary, standard of damages for retaliation
claims."8 o The court found support for its holdings in the plain
language of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides in the first sentence that,
for violations of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA,
the employer "shall be liable ... in the amount of. . . unpaid minimum
wages, or ... unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional

equal amount as liquidated damages.""' In contrast, the second
sentence provides that, for violations of the retaliation provision, the
employer "shall be liable for such . . . relief as may be appropriate to

effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without
limitation ...

an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."'a

mandatory language for an award of liquidated damages in wage and overtime cases and
gave the district court discretion to award liquidated damages based on the facts of the
retaliation case); Blanton v. City of Murfreesboro, 856 F.2d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an award of liquidated damages is discretionary in a retaliation case and
should only be granted if it effectuates the purposes of the retaliation provision of the
FLSA)). The district court in Moore applied the analysis employed in both Braswell and
Blanton, and held that an award of $30,000 for economic damages was "sufficient to
effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) and that no award of liquidated damages was
necessary." Id. at 1241.
130. Id. at 1242-43 (second alteration in original). The Eleventh Circuit held the
decisions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits to be persuasive because they "dealt directly
with whether liquidated damages are mandatory or discretionary in retaliation cases,
analyzed the statute, and emphasized the different language in the retaliation provision
of section 216(b) as compared to the minimum wages and overtime provision." Id. at 1240.
131. Id. at 1241 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
132. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The court noted that
[tihis second sentence [of section 216(b)] was added by amendment in 1977 to
provide damages in private causes of action to enforce the anti-retaliation
provisions of the FLSA, and clearly was for the purpose of allowing separate and
more extensive relief to an employee in case of retaliation. And, it is just as clear
that the extent of that separate relief is discretionary, requiring a finding that any
such relief, even relief not mentioned in the non-exclusive examples, is appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of the retaliation section of the law.
Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the reasonable good faith exception in
§ 260 made clear that an award for liquidated damages must also be mandatory (subject
to the reasonable good faith exception) for retaliation claims. Id. The court held that § 260
already existed when § 216(b) was amended in 1977 to include a reference to retaliation,
and if Congress wanted to mandate an award of liquidated damages in retaliation cases
(subject to the reasonable good faith exception), it would and could have done so at that
time. Moore, 708 F.3d at 1241-42. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
finding the language of the second sentence to be discretionary would require the
overturning of two of the court's prior panel decisions because "no issue was discussed as
to whether liquidated damages were mandatory or discretionary" in those cases. Id. at
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Accordingly, the court held "that the retaliation provision of 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) gives the district court discretion to award, or not to award,
liquidated damages, after determining whether doing so would be
appropriate under the facts of the case.""s3
B. Whether a DistrictCourt Retains OriginalJurisdiction Over
Pendent State Law Claims Against Non-FDIC Partiesin a Case
Removed by the FDIC if the FDIC Is Later Dismissed
In Lindley v. FDIC,""the Eleventh Circuit joined the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in holding
that, when the FDIC is a party to a lawsuit and the FDIC removes the
case to federal court, the district court maintains original jurisdiction
over pendent state law claims against the non-FDIC parties, even after
the FDIC is dismissed from the case."3 ' The lawsuits giving rise to the
consolidated appeal in Lindley arose out of the failed renovation of a
building. The plaintiffs were tenants who had leased or purchased floor
space in the building, and the defendants included the plaintiffs' bank
and various real estate developers and contractors. The plaintiffs filed
suit in state court and asserted state law claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.'3 6
After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant bank failed and the FDIC,
as receiver, was substituted as a party in the lawsuits."' The FDIC
removed the cases to the district court under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)

1242. In fact, the court held that
these earlier cases point to the need for the court in this case to establish a clear
answer to the question of whether in an FLSA retaliation case a district court in
this circuit must award liquidated damages in the absence of proof of a reasonable
good faith exception, or may do so in its discretion if that would "be appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of' the retaliation section.
Id.
133. Moore, 708 F.3d at 1243.
134. 733 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2013).
135. Id. at 1058; see generally Adair v. Lease Partners, Inc., 578 F.3d 238 (5th Cir.
2009); Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586 (8th Cir. 2009), FDIC v. Four Star Holding Co., 178
F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1999).
136. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1048. The plaintiffs' claims against the bank were based
solely on a letter written by a bank officer that contained statements regarding when funds
would be made available for the renovation of the building and the amount of funds
supposedly guaranteed by the bank to be available. The letter was not presented to, or
approved by, the bank's board of directors, and the plaintiffs never confirmed the veracity
of the letter with anyone else at the bank. The plaintiffs also did not enter into any formal
agreements with the bank relating to the subject funds or the renovation. Id. at 1048-49.
137. Id. at 1049.
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which provides that "the [FDIC] may . . . remove any action,

suit, or proceeding from a [sitate court to the appropriate United States
district court.""' The plaintiffs moved to remand, citing an exception
to the FDIC's removal authority for cases in which "only the interpretation of the law of [the] [sitate is necessary" to resolve the case.140 The
FDIC opposed the motions to remand and moved for summary judgment
on all claims, arguing that federal law compelled dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the doctrine established by the United
States Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,4 known as
the D'Oench Doctrine.'
The district court denied the plaintiffs'
motions to remand, granted the FDIC's motions for summary judgment,
and dismissed all claims against the FDIC. 4 8 Then, assuming that it
lacked original jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' pendent state law claims
against the non-FDIC defendants, the district court chose not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)1" and dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims. 4 s
On appeal, the non-FDIC defendants argued that the district court
should not have dismissed the remaining claims because the district
court "ha[d] original jurisdiction over [the remaining] state law claims

138. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (2012).
139. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1049, 1050 (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B)).
140. Id. at 1049 (first alteration in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(D) (2012)).
"The sole exception to the FDIC's authority to remove a case once it becomes a party is
triggered when: (1) a state authority appointed the FDIC as receiver; (2) the litigation
involves only the pre-closing rights against the failed institution; and (3) only state law
need be interpreted." Id. at 1051.
141. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
142. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1049. The FDIC argued that in addition to the state law
issues presented, federal law compelled dismissal of the claims against the FDIC under the
D'Oench Doctrine and the statutes that incorporate and codify it. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1823(e) (2012) and 1821(dX9)(A) (2012)). The D'Oench Doctrine is a rule that provides,
In a suit over the enforcement of an agreement originally executed between an
insured depository institution and a private party, a private party may not enforce
against a federal deposit insurer any obligation not specifically memorialized in
a written document such that the agency would be aware of the obligation when
conducting an examination of the institution's records.
Id. at 1051 (quoting Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (11th
Cir. 1991) (citingD'Oench, 315 U.S. at 459)). The D'Oench Doctrine is codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) and prevents bank customers from relying on agreements outside the documents
contained in the bank's records to defeat a claim of the FDIC. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 105152.
143. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1049.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012).
145. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1049.
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against non-FDIC defendants [even] after the FDIC [was] dismissed
from the case.""' The non-FDIC defendants argued that federal courts
have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the laws of
the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,' and that "all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity to which the [FDIC], in any
capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States" under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A).1 48 Noting that "lwihether a federal court has jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim that
the FDIC has removed to the [district [clourt when the FDIC is later
dismissed from the case is an issue of first impression in our Circuit,"
the court held that "this question turns on the meaning of § 1819(bX2)(A), and, in particular, the term 'is a party' as used in that statute."4 9
Finding the statutory language ambiguous, the court looked to the
legislative history to determine whether the term "is a party" meant that
the FDIC need only be a party when the suit is filed to create jurisdiction over all claims, or whether the FDIC must remain a party
throughout the case to maintain federal jurisdiction over pendent state
law claims.5 o The legislative history indicates that § 1819(b)(2) was
enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 19891s to provide a federal forum for FDIC
enforcement actions and actions brought by non-FDIC plaintiffs.1 52

146. Id. (alterations in original). On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) the
district court lacked jurisdiction over their state law claims and therefore erred in denying
their motions to remand; and (2) even assuming it had subject matter jurisdiction, the
district court erred in granting the FDIC's motion for summary judgment under the
D'Oench Doctrine. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the first argument, citing the "special
provisions" that provide federal courts with original jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil
nature .. . to which the [FDIC], in any capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under
the laws of the United States." Id. at 1049-50 (alteration in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§ 1819(b)(2)(A); Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 781 (11th Cir. 2005)).
The court further held that the state law exception to the FDIC's removal authority did not
apply because the FDIC asserted a federal defense-the D'Oench Doctrine-that was not
only colorable, but dispositive. Id. at 1051. Regarding the plaintiffs' second argument, the
court held that because the plaintiffs had failed to establish any exception to the
application of the D'Oench Doctrine, the district court correctly granted summary judgment
in favor of the FDIC. Id. at 1052-55.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
148. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 12
U.S.C. 1819(bX2)(A)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1056.
151. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
152. Lindley, 733 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Castleberry, 408 F.3d at 788 ("[The terms of
12 U.S.C. § 1819 evince a clear congressional intent to provide a federal forum when the
FDIC is made a party to state court litigation")).

1130

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Thus, the court held that these goals were better served if the statute's
use of "is a party" means that the FDIC need only be a party when the
lawsuit is filed to establish jurisdiction over all claims.153 The court
also held this interpretation of § 1819(b)(2)(A), which creates federal
jurisdiction at the time of the filing, to be consistent with other
longstanding principles of statutory construction."' Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "when the FDIC is a party to a civil suit
and removes that case to federal court, the [dlistrict [clourt has original
jurisdiction over claims against non-FDIC defendants, and this
jurisdiction is not lost if the FDIC is later dismissed from the case."' 55
Based on this conclusion, the court in Lindley held that even though the
only remaining claims were state law claims involving non-FDIC parties,
the district court erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' claims against the non-FDIC defendants under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) because 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) created original
jurisdiction over those claims."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

This survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, many of
which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While this Article is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have
attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by
providing them with relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice
and procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1057 (finding that "relevant canons of construction support an interpretation
of § 1819(b)(2)(A) that creates federal jurisdiction over pendent state law claims at the time
the FDIC becomes involved in the litigation").
155. Id. at 1058. The court held this conclusion to be supported by the legislative
history of the statute, other canons of statutory construction, its own prior precedent, and
"the weight of persuasive authority from other Circuits." Id.
156. Id. at 1059.

